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The world has been in the midst of a techno-economic transformation with farreaching effects. It proceeds with unprecedented speed, as is often captured with reference to Moore's Law.
It is a complex, technical, and therefore esoteric phenomenon, with the consequence that its nature and projections even in the near term are understood by a relative few. It has wide-ranging consequences for society, including effects on the world of work, inequality, and social stratification. This paper raises some preliminary questions and ideas for a research agenda regarding some centuries. Second, the present focus is specifically on the representational changes that may result from, and the interests and policies that address, the current technoeconomic transformation.
In considering the way the new techno-economic transformation may be changing the structures of representation, the analysis narrows this focus in two ways.
First it looks at "popular" voice or representation; that is, "elite" or capital interests are not taken up here, though these are clearly important-and indeed often the most powerful drivers of policy. However, the present question concerns channels of popular representation-and, indeed, countervailing power to those commanding concentrated interests.
Second, the paper focuses on the capacity of citizens to organize for making political claims or demands specifically regarding what can be referred to as productionist issues that arise with new hi-tech economy, that is, issues of economic policy and regulation, at both the micro and macro levels-policies that may guide the goals of technology development, how technology is implemented, and how its social and economic consequences are regulated.
These policy issues are not only of analytic interest. They are clearly salient for firms and economic actors-both those who advance the changes and those challenged or disrupted by them. But they are also salient, indeed increasingly salient, for the population in general, given that the hi-tech economy has distributive and employment effects and raises a host of normative issues. The recent publicity over privacy issues has heightened the perceived need for scrutiny of the consequences of technology in general, and the potential impacts on inequality and employment have received increasing media attention. In recent years, open-ended survey questions in the OECD as well as Latin American countries reveal the high salience of economic issues in general and jobs more specifically. America, where unions were subordinated and coopted by the state. Substantial variation also existed within each of these types.
In sum, through most of the 20 th century, unions were the dominant actors in the popular interest regime. They obviously were not the only popular organizations, but they were dominant in the West as well as in Latin America. Further, the issues that preoccupied them were productionist, that is, micro and macro materialist issues of employment and economic regulation. Notwithstanding variation across cases, they had quite institutionalized access to the policy-making process at both these levels. and an orthogonal dimension in issue space emerged. These rights issues concerned civil rights, human rights, women's rights, LGBT rights, disability rights, animal rights, and so forth; prominent among the risks were nuclear and environmental risks.
As with the earlier diffusion of a labor movement, these rights and risks movements also diffused internationally. However, in many other regions, the rights issue dominating the agenda was democratic rights and regime transitions.
These new organizations were analyzed under the rubric of the new social movements-a label that made an explicit contrast with unions as the "old" social movement. The constituency for these new issues was not based in a face-to-face setting like a factory but was a much more dispersed set of sympathizers. Rather than bureaucratized unions, hierarchically organized into peak associations, willing to collaborate with the state, these were analyzed as participant, anti-authority, and world. But an important point is that these materialist issues were consumptionist, rather than the productionist issues that unions traditionally took up.
Corresponding to this organizational proliferation and consistent with liberalizing orientations on the right as well as with notions of deepening democracy on the left, came an orientation toward "civil society"-consistent with a pre-occupation with nonstate actors. This analytical model was advanced by activists as well as international financial institutions, and the model also came to be a central focus in the social sciences. Civil society organizations (CSOs) proliferated-from professionalized NGOs, acting both domestically and internationally, to grass-roots community organizations.
For many civil society organizations, as for SMOs, funding is uncertain and must be constantly renewed. Some are quite precarious, though some are well resourced, with ties to international funding and/or access to state resources, either as grants or contracts for research or service delivery. Also, rather than members, they are likely to have fluctuating relations with constituencies and beneficiaries and, like social movement organizations, intermittent participants. Also like the latter, they tend not to be hierarchically organized but instead related in a network. As a result, both mobilizing individuals and coordinating organizations for collective action may be more difficult, though this is an important area of research. Many of these organizations do not make demands on the state, but some do through a variety of demand-making strategies.
Most deliver services of one type or another.
Another effect of economic liberalization and globalization is that unions have been weakened with privatization, greater competition, and the growth of a secondary labor market. A dualistic labor market had started earlier in Latin America, because late development never absorbed as much labor as early development, and an older urban informal sector started to expand in the 1950s-60s. The size of the sector bumped up in 12 the 1980s, with the lost decade of the international debt crisis and the move to more marketized economic models.
As is well documented, a secondary labor market also grew in the advanced economies. In both regions, while many labor market insiders-those with security of employment and generally better wages and benefits-are still protected, they are under pressure and on the defensive, albeit with variation across countries. Unions have declined in density, power, and political influence, though again to different degrees in different countries. It is this abundance that has enabled the age of big data, analytics, and social media, as well as a new cyber-coordinated labor market.
My thinking about the political effects of this transformation is substantially informed by the US case. However, one cannot generalize from the US case, and it is precisely a comparative analysis of these issues and the need to explain variation that I want to advocate. Nevertheless, the US case may be helpful in pointing to certain trends and challenges and, at least, in identifying the policy issues that might be engaged.
The social consequences of the Algorithmic Revolution are too numerous, varied, and well known to list here. They range from privacy concerns, to discriminatory internet searches, the decollectivization of risk, and personalized pricing. Here, I focus on the consequences for the world of work. 3 These consequences are wide ranging, and include, for example, new data management systems, often in brick and mortar settings, that increase the monitoring of work or that increase contingency in the dual labor market by scheduling work to adjust to demand in real time, distributing risk to the worker, whose own scheduling and income become uncertain and unstable. For present purposes, however, I want to consider two particular consequences for the world of work: the generation of jobs and on-demand work. Both raise key questions of productionist policy. In the last few years, these have become increasingly visible political issues of both micro and macro economic policy.
The first, then, is the generation of jobs. Some analyses now suggest that automation has entered a new historic phase, because of both robotics and the analytics of big data. Some now argue that instead of increasing both productivity and also jobs, as occurred during past technological innovations, technology may overall be destroying jobs. A first round of theorizing suggested that routine jobs in manufacturing or whitecollar office work would be at risk, but more skilled jobs have also become vulnerable as more and more tasks become automated and commodified.
Indeed, even the most highly skilled jobs have been affected, as can be seen in a lecture by a PhD in computer science who had a career as a top machine-learning researcher at GE. In the lecture, entitled "Data-Driven Analytics in the Industrial Internet or How to Destroy My Job," 4 the speaker described how his job had constantly changed over his career, as at each phase the tasks became automated. His point was that building analytic models used to be an artisanal process, but even that is becoming automated through the use of meta-heuristics. He argued, "in the future, we expect data-driven analytic models to become a commodity." So commodification and the elimination of jobs may not be limited to only blue-and white-and pink-collar jobs, and the solution may not be simply training.
The jobs issue does not appear to be limited to the US or advanced economies.
A recent study showed a decline in labor share of national income in over 70 percent of 59 countries on which data were available from 1975 to 2012, and that included Mexico, China, and India. Out of ten major economic sectors examined, employment declined in six of them, and increased in only two. Finally, the authors suggest that these declines occur within sectors, rather than shifts in their relative size.
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No doubt, employment is expanding not only in some traditional sectors (like healthcare) but also in sectors created or boosted by the new technology. The latter include non-technical, traditional jobs in hi tech firms jobs, which tend to be outsourced, like gardeners, food workers, bus drivers, and office workers; "data janitors"-the nonautomated "cultural data workers" behind artificial intelligence; 6 transportation/delivery, warehouse, and logistic workers who accommodate the rise in e-commerce; etc.
Perhaps most obviously, and as will be discussed below, it also includes the expansion of technical jobs and those that are facilitated by cyber-coordination of the market on new platforms.
Despite these growth areas, the net balance of jobs, or the net effect of technology to displace rather than replace jobs, remains unknown. Nevertheless, the discussion of this uncertainty raises interesting policy challenges for stimulating job The second effect of technology on the world of work to be considered here concerns the type of job or employment relations-particularly the way it seems to boost micro-entrepreneurship and the atomization of work. In contrast to the industrial revolution with its proletarian employment relations and the pattern of selling one's labor typically long-term to a single employer, a common pattern in the new economy is not to find a job, but to make one and to be a contractor or freelancer rather than employee.
The new technology has facilitated a decomposition of work, with short-terms arrangements ranging from the project to the "gig" or even the micro-task in a pattern of "on-demand" work. Accompanying that arrangement is uncertain work and remuneration in a form of piecework. Further, the new technology of communication facilitates work at a distance, so that remote workers are dispersed, often in their own homes, and do not meet face-to-face. Like the unemployed, atomized workers are hard to organize. Indeed, they often "confront" one another as competitors.
One can perhaps distinguish two subgroups in this growing world of work. The first consists of those in new hi-tech fields. Needless to say, the hi-tech sector hires a lot of people, but it has also spurred a new world of micro-entrepreneurs. The second are those in a labor-market that is cyber-coordinated by platforms in the cloud. Both have particular interests or issues generated by their work, and they also pose some macro issues.
The hi-tech workers range from those who begin new start-ups and those who make apps, to those in the new "maker movement." This world of work is one with a high failure rate and low-at best postponed-income, and in places like San Francisco and Austin, often involves living in cramped hacker hotels. It may be a model in which success is rare and thus depends on a lot of people willing to take the risk of a low-17 probability outcome. It is a world of work with a high rate of turnover and one that attracts a particular group: especially young males during the period in their lives when they can afford that kind of life style.
This of course is not to deny that many start-ups are founded by people who have already made it big, or, for instance, have comfortable jobs teaching in universities.
But along with a certain number of millionaires and professors, in many ways it is a model of a problematic world of work.
The second group of micro-entrepreneurs are workers cyber-coordinated by platforms, where any bits of unused value can become a marketable commodity-assets like a room in your home (AirBnB), a ride in your car (Uber), slivers of time, or expertise-even a medical consultation (e.g., Mechanical Turk, TaskRabbit, Upwork, Doctor on Demand).
Some of these workers may sell quite high levels of skill and may do quite well on a project basis. Some appreciate the flexibility of part-time work and the ability to choose hours of work as they will. For some it is supplementary to other work or activity. While these issues of potential low labor absorption and atomized microentrepreneurialism may be associated with the new hi-tech economy, they are familiar in Latin America; and in a certain sense, these traits have a lot in common with the informal sector, which has been studied for decades. Political scientists have studied informality precisely because it has raised the micro and macro issues of jobs and economic regulation-such as the precariousness and instability of work, the lack of formal jobs, and social policy. Informality in Latin America has also raised the problems of the 19 collective action and political representation faced by these workers. Survey analysis in the region has suggested that an atomized world of work, without providing a large workbased network, has substantially demobilized workers in their capacity to address productionist problems not only in the work place but also in the political arena. 9 Thus, these kinds of "late-development" questions again arise in the context of hi-tech development.
Cross-country comparative analyses are needed because one can expect that these job market effects of the new technologies will play out differently across different countries. How that happens will probably depend on at least two interacting factors.
The first is the niches countries occupy in the international economy or their positions in the international chain of value creation and hence on the size of different economic "sectors." 10 Conceptualizing and understanding these niches in the world economy of the 21 st century is important.
Second, it will vary with policy-that is, politics. Thus, we come back to the central question of the capacity of popular organizations to play an influential role on these issues.
Capacity of the Popular Interest Regime
As we have seen, the new, more pluralistic interest regime has components with a variety of different models of organization, issues areas, repertoires of action, and perhaps different capacities for collective action and demand making. Future research on the capacity of the popular interest regime for addressing these economic, productionist issues might focus on three areas of variation across cases. Second, what is the capacity of the "new" organizations to engage these productionist or economic issues? In many ways, the rights and risks social movements have proven to be quite effective, as indicated by substantial success they have achieved-e.g., women's and LGBT rights, air pollution, and, in Europe, GMO regulation. Consumptionist, distributive issues have also had substantial success, as can be seen, for example, in the dramatic expansion of pensions and cash transfer policies in Latin America to labor market outsiders and to the informal sector, though the politics of these expansions has varied. On the other side are the tech skeptics, including some major critics from within the hi-tech sectors (Jaron Lanier or Evgeny Morozov). 16 A relevant point of these more balanced analyses is that social media may be effective tools to do some things, like "identify, recruit, mobilize, and coordinate supporters" -for activities such as protesting, signing petitions, and fundraising, but they also may undermine organization by circumventing it. 17 So there may be a trade-off, in which the very ease of coordinating individuals remotely, online, sidesteps the need for organization in the initial stages.
Social media seems effective in convoking large numbers for opposition to, e.g., the system, the regime, leaders, corruption. Large protests, augmented and intensified by social media, can even bring down governments. More problematic is constructing organizations that can step into the void and engage the policy-making process. The
Arab Spring protests have widely been analyzed in this way, but it's an area where research is needed.
To push this idea further, could it be that the very ease of convoking and coordinating individuals without organization leads to a kind of opposition as performance? At the limit, opposition might become a kind of flash mob or a transgressive performance without specific goals, a well-thought out analysis of the situation, and some idea of the way forward. Perhaps an example is the Occupy movement in the US, which seemed to emerge out of nowhere, but then failed to really engage issues in a serious way that made actual policy demands. In fact, for many of the Occupy participants it was not even considered advantageous to agree on a program, but rather the idea was to be an oppositional presence and engage in a participatory process.
One can be optimistic or pessimistic about these movements that use social media to diffuse so quickly and to coordinate collective action. On the one hand, they often seem to be episodic and then disappear, without leaving behind an organization that could perform the important and necessary functions of institutionalized access and representation. On the other hand, they avoid Michels's iron law of oligarchy, which is, as he states it: "Who says organization says oligarchy."
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Further, this kind of horizontal, leaderless movement, precisely in its performative aspect, may, as Castells argues, play an important role in that it can dramatically raise issues and change society's understanding and values. 19 And these movements do seem to have been able to at least raise the issues of inequality, jobs, and economic regulation. Rather than a dilemma or trade-off between organization and a movement, perhaps democratic representation requires both.
But the question remains: what organizations can take up these issues?
In assessing the role of social media in coordinating the action of social movements, it should also be borne in mind that the internet and social media can be a tool not only for citizens to make claims or policy demands, but also of power. 20 Apparently the Piñera government in Chile attempted to intervene in the student movement in that way. And monied interests especially have the resources to collect the data, develop the algorithms, and undertake the analytics to advance their interests. As I asked years ago when analyzing corporatism, we have to ask who is doing what to whom and how? 21 The answer is surely complicated-and certainly important.
In conclusion, the new economy raises fundamental micro and macro policy issues, and the popular interest regime consists of a variety of kinds of organizations with different capacities for representation-different resources, types of collective action, and points of access in the policy process. The question for future research, then, is: what are the consequences of economic and technological change for ordinary people and also for their ability to have a voice in these matters. Different patterns will unfold in different parts of the world and in different countries. We need a comparative perspective for understanding these important questions.
